-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 _=_ Warped Force Advisory #2 _=_ Subject: Vulnerability in Sawmill for Solaris v. 6.2.14 Author: darky0da Discovered: 2.8.02 Announced to BugTraq: 2.11.02 Vendor Status: Vendor notified on 2.9.02 and verified issue. Upgrade v. 6.2.15 released on 2.10.02 Platform(s) Tested: Solaris 2.8; may also include other UNIX versions Product Homepage: http://www.sawmill.net Problem / Exploit: When the Sawmill executable is launched and the user enters an initial password,the password is saved in file AdminPassword. This file is created mode 0666 (world read/writeable permissions). This happens regardless of the password_file_permissions setting in file DefaultConfig, which is by default set to mode 0600. I have tried this with user and root privileges and it occurs in each instance. The default path to file AdminPassword is accessible to users. The LogAnalysisInfo directory is created mode 0755. The contents of the AdminPassword file are MD5'ed. It is trivial to overwrite this value with a password of my choosing: "rm AdminPassword; echo mypasswd | perl -p -e 'chomp' | md5sum | \ | sed 's/ -//' | perl -p -e 'chomp' > AdminPassword" I have tested the above thoroughly and it works quite well, allowing me access to all parts of the Sawmill pages. Solution: Upgrade to version 6.2.15; chmod 600 AdminPassword Shouts: sawmill folks pworks grdpnt-l Hush provide the worlds most secure, easy to use online applications - which solution is right for you? HushMail Secure Email http://www.hushmail.com/ HushDrive Secure Online Storage http://www.hushmail.com/hushdrive/ Hush Business - security for your Business http://www.hush.com/ Hush Enterprise - Secure Solutions for your Enterprise http://www.hush.com/ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Version: Hush 2.1 Note: This signature can be verified at https://www.hushtools.com wl0EARECAB0FAjxoKc8WHGRhcmt5MGRhQGh1c2htYWlsLmNvbQAKCRDhjV5drgDCy/pH AJ4vNqk289HWt0kavBuPkCpjMj2bUACeOZhYWwhhN+RcFh2zZcXEqtvtffc= =Xsdf -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----